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A TRIBUTE TO JUDGE FRANK M. COFFIN
Honorable Stephen Breyer*
Frank Coffin's colleagues are lucky. They can hear, or read, not
only his published judicial work, but also certain unpublished writ-
ings-writings that help explain why it is such a pleasure to serve on
a court with this man. There is, for example, his "Private Conversa-
tion Between Two Supreme Court Justices about a Recent Patent
Case and its Relation to Hercules and the Augean Stables," deliv-
ered at an informal dinner of our circuit in Washington, D.C., with
one of the Supreme Court justices present (and wondering whether
such a conversation really took place); there is his "Secret Thoughts
of a Chief Judge of the First Circuit (about the Others)," presented
at a recent retirement dinner; there is his "Thoughts from the Ashes
of Mount Vesuvius, being a Private Letter of Pliny the Younger to
his Uncle Pliny the Elder, Written with the Hope of Future Discov-
ery by Those Concerned about Legal Ethics," read to a law school
class on legal ethics. These writings would help you understand
Frank Coffin's wit, style, insight, good humor, and sober underlying
thought, all of which translate-on a circuit court- into collegiality,
respect, and fellowship.
Though only some of us have the chance to appreciate all of
Frank Coffin's writings, all of us can appreciate some of them-and,
far and away, the most important of them, namely, his judicial work.
If you read Frank's opinions you will notice a number of remarkable
things. You will notice that his work embodies the judicial values
that he himself has so clearly described in The Ways of a Judge,1
values to which all judges aspire. You will notice, as well, that his
work has often foreshadowed that of the Supreme Court. Indeed,
judicially speaking, he often prophesies, and, unlike many of us, he
prophesies before, and not after, the fact.
Consider, for example, two of his important first amendment deci-
sions. In Goguen v. Smith,2 Judge Coffin considered the constitu-
tionality of a state statute which criminalized the "contemptuous"
treatment of the American flag. Finding that the statute unconstitu-
tionally infringed first amendment rights, Judge Coffin said that
"[w]hile it may be that disrespect for the flag can constitute grounds
for non-criminal sanctions, we think that promotion of loyalty and
patriotism may not constitutionally furnish a justification for impo-
sition of criminal penalties." 3
* Chief Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit.
1. F. CoFFiN, THE WAYS OF A JUDG& RErLECTONS FROm THE FEDRAL APPELLATE
BENC (1980).
2. 471 F.2d 88, 95 (1st Cir. 1972), affd, 415 U.S. 566 (1974).
3. Id. at 101.
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Nearly two decades later, the Supreme Court followed Judge Cof-
fin's lead in two recent "flag-burning" cases, Texas v. Johnson' and
United States v. Eichmann, which held state and federal flag anti-
desecration statutes, respectively, to be contrary to the first amend-
ment principles so eloquently discussed in Judge Coffin's opinion.
More recently, Frank and I were on the same panel in a case con-
sidering to what extent the first amendment should prohibit adverse
government personnel actions, short of outright dismissal, which
were motivated by the employee's political affiliation.' In yet an-
other forceful opinion, Judge Frank Coffin extended the rights of
government employees beyond the right not to be dismissed, to pro-
tect them from demotion as well. In doing so, however, he was care-
ful to formulate a "workable standard. . . in a way that will neither
unduly strain governments with harassing lawsuits nor unduly dis-
courage employees with formidable complaints from asserting their
rights."17 Once again, Frank foreshadowed subsequent developments,
for the Supreme Court only a few months later followed his lead,
extending the anti-patronage protections of government employees
beyond outright discharge.8
More important than predicting the direction our Supreme Court
will ultimately take, Frank Coffin has a particular talent for creat-
ing, in "unknown judicial territory," where the need for guidance is
imperative, standards that both flow from prior precedent and ex-
plain in a highly practical way how those subject to the standards
must act in the future. Read his opinions. You will see him marshall
the facts and show where and how those facts place the particular
case within the great web of statutes, regulations, rules, standards,
and precedents that are the "law." You will see how that web itself
changes, bending, shifting, breaking, or reestablishing connections,
as it responds to the pressure placed upon it by the force of the
particular factual circumstance. You will understand how the indi-
vidual circumstances of the case help to maintain, to modify, or to
create, a broader rule of law. You will understand because his opin-
ions clearly and convincingly explain just why and how the court
reaches its result. They describe, and treat, openly and honestly, the
record-established facts and all relevant legal background, regardless
of how difficult an abstruse legal argument may be to understand, or
how awkward a particular fact may be for the theory of an opinion.
4. 109 S. Ct. 2533 (1989).
5. 110 S. Ct. 2404 (1990).
6. See Agosto-De-Feliciano v. Aponte-Roque, 889 F.2d 1209, 1214-18 (lst Cir.
1989).
7. Id. at 1217.
8. See Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois, 110 S. Ct. 2729 (1990).
9. See, e.g., Schneider v. Colegio de Abogados de Puerto Rico, 917 F.2d 620 (let
Cir. 1990) (bar association could use compulsory dues for purposes directly related to
legal profession but not for controversial political purposes).
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And, most important of all, Frank Coffin's work reflects an under-
standing of, and sympathy for, the human problems that underlie
the cases that make their way to courts of appeals. His opinions
make sense in human terms. He sees the need to balance and to
compromise the various desirable objectives that human beings in
society need to achieve.10
This talent-imaginatively to understand the scope of the human
problem, to develop rules, standards, and examples that will create a
practical and human legal environment surrounding and sustaining
social activity, and to do this within the context of strict standards
of craftsmanship-is, I believe, a unique achievement. That is why
his colleagues consider him-in the words of his own book-more
than a "mere jobbist," but instead a "master craftsman."' That is
why we all have learned so much from him. And that is one rea-
son-but only one of the very many reasons-why we all look for-
ward to many more years of work and personal association with the
man to whom this issue has been dedicated, Frank Coffin.
10. See, e.g., Nolan v. Scafati, 430 F.2d 548 (1st Cir. 1970) (prisoners have due
process right to communicate with lawyers by mail); In re San Juan Star Co., 662
F.2d 108 (1st Cir. 1981) (right of defendants to fair trial outweighed press's right to
dissemination of information obtained through trial discovery).
11. F. CoFFiN, supra note 1, at 196.
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